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THE MARYLAND CERTIFICATE OF QUALIFIED EXPERT
REQUIREMENT: A FLIMSY SHIELD FOR CORPORATIONS
ENGAGED IN ARCHITECTURE AND
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING
I.

INTRODUCTION

If an individual sues a licensed professional in Maryland, it is clear
that he or she must file a certificate of a qualified expert within ninety
days after filing the complaint. l Failure to do so entitles the defendant to dismissal without prejudice. 2 This provision applies to "licensed professionals,"3 which include architects, interior designers,
landscape architects, professional engineers, and professional land
surveyors or property line surveyors. 4 On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland has held that a corporate defendant, which
offers the above-listed professional services, is not entitled to dismissal
without prejudice if the plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified
expert. 5 This issue is particularly important to practitioners in construction law, as the Court of Appeals' decision allows a suit against a
corporate defendant to be maintained if a certificate of a qualified
expert is not filed. Further, if a corporate defendant is not entitled to
the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement, complainants may be able to engage in legalized blackmail
against corporate defendants who have not actually provided services
negligently.6 Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has ruled
on the issue, 7 its decision was erroneous and did not consider the severe impact on corporate defendants.
1. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a)(I)-(2) (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 3-2G-Ol(b); see also id. at § 3-2G-02(a).
4. Id. § 3-2C-Ol(c) (1)-(5).
5. Baltimore County v. RTKL Assocs. Inc., 380 Md. 670, 690, 846 A.2d 433,
445 (2004). This decision can be contrasted with the 2002 decision by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which indicated that if a complainant sues a corporation engaged in professional engineering, failure to file a
certificate of a qualified expert does entitle the defendant to dismissal without prejudice. Heritage Harbour, L.L.C. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 143 Md.
App. 698, 709, 795 A.2d 806, 812 (2002). The U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland, however, has explicitly held that a professional association engaged in engineering is not entitled to dismissal based on the complaining party's failure to file a certificate of a qualified expert. Adams v.
NVR Homes, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 675,716 (D. Md. 2001). Each of these
cases will be discussed in greater detail infra Parts III.B.I-B.3.
6. This possibility is outlined in detail infra Part 1I1.E.
7. See, e.g. RTKL Assocs., Inc., 380 Md. at 689-90,846 A.2d at 444-45.
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This comment will explore whether a corporation practicing architecture should be entitled to the protections offered by the certificate
of a qualified expert requirement. Furthermore, this comment will
argue that such protections should also extend to a corporation practicing professional engineering even though professional engineering
firms are not required to file with the State Board for Professional
Engineers. 8
In Parts II.A.-II.B., this comment outlines the general requirements
for architectural and engineering practice in Maryland. In Part II.C.,
it provides an in-depth analysis of the certificate of qualified expert
requirement. In Part II.D., it explores how other states with similar
laws have ruled on the issue. Then Part III.A. illustrates how Maryland
courts have interpreted a similar provision in the Health Care Malpractice Statute. 9 Part III.B. discusses the cases, in detail, which have
interpreted the statute. Part III.C. focuses on the purposes of corporate practice and the rationale behind the statute requiring a certificate of a qualified expert. Part III.D. addresses arguments against the
extension of the protection to corporate practice. Part III.E. demonstrates that the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement must be extended to corporations practicing
architecture and professional engineering. Finally, Part III.F. illustrates that no distinction should be made between corporations that
practice architecture and those engaged in professional engineering.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Practice of Architecture

An individual may practice architecture,1O provided he or she obtains a license from the State Board of Architects to do SO.11 Maryland
requires that an architect obtain a license to practice architecture because of the state's interest in "safeguard[ingJ life, health, public
8. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & PROF. §§ 14-10l to 14-602 (2004). There

are no provisions in the Maryland Professional Engineers Act that require a
corporation practicing professional engineering to file anything with the
State Board for Professional Engineers. See id. Conversely, in the Maryland
Architects Act, corporations practicing architecture are required to obtain
a permit from the State Board of Architects. Id. § 3-403(a).
9. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoe. § 3-2A-04(b) (Supp.2004).
10. "Practice architecture" is defined as "provid[ingJ any service or creative
work: (i) in regard to an addition to, alteration of, or construction of a
building or an integral part of a building; and (ii) that requires education,
training, and experience in architecture." MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. &
PROF. § 3-101 (l) (1) (2004). Activities that fall within the meaning of practice architecture include architectural design, consultation, coordination of
the design, evaluation of the design, investigation of a design, and planning. Id. § 3-lO1 (l)(2).
11. Id. § 3-302(a).
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safety, and property and [in] promot[ing] the public welfare."12 To
obtain a license, the applicant must meet certain preliminary requirements 13 and pass an examination given by the State Board of
Architects. 14
A single architect or group of architects can form a variety of corporate entities. An architect can choose to form a corporation by filing
articles of incorporation with the State Department of Assessments
and Taxation (SDAT); the corporate existence begins when the SDAT
accepts the articles. 15 An architect, or group of architects, also has the
option of forming a close corporation by stating the election in the
articles of incorporation. 16 Architects can also form a professional
corporation. 17

12. Id. § 3-102. Maryland courts have determined that requiring a license for
the practice of architecture is not a revenue measure, but rather regulatory
in nature. Snodgrass v. Immler, 232 Md. 416, 422, 194 A.2d 103, 106
(1963). Therefore, a suit by an unlicensed architect for architectural fees
will not prevail. Id. at 424, 194 A.2d at 107.
13. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-303(a)-(c). The applicant must "be
of good character and reputation." Id. § 3-303(b). The applicant must also
meet minimum education and experience levels. Id. § 3-303(c).
14. Id. § 3-303(d).
15. MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & AsS'NS § 2-102(a)-(b) (1999); Bostetter v. Freestate Land Corp., 48 Md. App. 142, 148,426 A.2d 404, 408 (1981), modified,
292 Md. 570, 440 A.2d 380 (1982).
16. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4-201 (a)-(b) (1). Many architects, when
forming corporations, choose to form a close corporation. By forming a
close corporation, the shareholders (who will most likely be running the
business) may be excused from having to comply with a number of corporate formalities. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MAcEY, CAsES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILI1Y COMPANIES 513 (8th ed. 2003). For instance, a corporation that
elects to be a close corporation can also elect to operate without a board of
directors. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 4-302. For a complete analysis of close corporation law, see Ronald M. Shapiro, The Statutory Close Corporation: A Critique and a Corporate Planning Alternative, 36 MD. L. REv. 289
(1976).
17. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 5-102(a). A professional corporation is
one that offers professional services. Id. Architecture is a professional service. Id. § 5-101 (g)(2)(i). A professional corporation may only issue stock
to individuals who are licensed in any state to practice the same profession
as that listed in the articles of incorporation, a general partnership consisting solely of licensees with at least one partner licensed in the state of Maryland, or another professional corporation organized to perform the same
service. Id. § 5-109(a). A majority of the professional corporation's officers
and directors (not including the secretary and treasurer) must also be licensed (in any state). Id. § 5-1l7(a). Because of the numerous restrictions
on professional corporations and the availability of other forms of corporate entities, it is difficult to see why architects would choose to form a
professional corporation.
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A licensed architect is authorized to practice architecture through a
corporation, partnership, or limited liability company.IS Nevertheless,
a licensed architect is not relieved of any individual liability he or she
may have regarding the practice of architecture by virtue of his or her
relationship to a corporation. 19 Before a corporation, partnership, or
limited liability company may perform architectural services, it must
obtain a permit from the State Board of Architects. 2o To be eligible
for a permit, at least two-thirds of the corporation's directors must be
licensed in Maryland or another state to practice architecture, engineering, or landscape architecture. 21 The corporation must also designate at least one "responsible member" who is a director and
licensed to practice architecture in Maryland. 22

B.

The Practice of Professional Engineering

An individual may practice professional engineering23 in Maryland
once he or she receives a license to do SO.24 Maryland requires an
engineer to obtain a license to practice professional engineering in
order to "safeguard life, health, and property and to promote the pub18. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402(a)(I). Additionally, a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company is permitted to practice architecture through a licensed architect. Id. § 3-402(a)(2).
19. Id. § 3-402 ( c) (2). Similarly, a corporation that practices architecture is not
relieved of liability for the acts or omissions of its directors, officers, employees or agents. Id. § 3-402 (c) (1).
20. Id. § 3-403(a). A corporation may, however, perform architectural services
for itself or an affiliate without a permit. Id. § 3-403(b).
21. Id. § 3-404(a), (b)(I).
22. Id. § 3-404(c). The responsible member is "in charge of architecture practiced through the corporation." Id. § 3-404 (c) (2).
23. Id. § 14-30I(a). The practice of professional engineering is defined as:
[P]rovid[ing] any service or creative work the performance of
which requires education, training, and experience in the application of:
(i) special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences; and
(ii) the principles and methods of engineering analysis and
design.
(2) In regard to a building or other structure, machine, equipment, process, works, system, project, or public or private utility,
"practice engineering" includes:
(i) consultation;
(ii) design;
(iii) evaluation;
(iv) inspection of construction to ensure compliance with
specifications and drawings;
(v) investigation;
(vi) planning; and
(vii) design coordination.
Id. § 14-lOI(f) (1)-(2).
24. Id. § 14-301 (a).
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lic welfare."25 To be eligible for a license, an individual must meet
initial requirements 26 and pass an examination. 27
Professional engineers have the same options in choosing a corporate form as architects. 28 Unlike a corporation engaged in architecture,29 a corporation which engages in professional engineering is not
required to obtain a permit. 30
C.

Certificate of Qualified Expert Requirement

When suing a "licensed professional," a claimant is required to file a
certificate of a qualified expert with the court. 31 Failure to file the
certificate within ninety days after filing the complaint entitles the defendant to dismissal without prejudice. 32 Upon request and a showing
of good cause by the claimant, the court has discretion to waive or
modifY this requirement. 33 The claimant may request otherwise discoverable information which is "reasonably necessary ... to obtain a
certificate of a qualified expert" within thirty days after the claim is
served. 34 A ninety-day time limit for filing the certificate of a qualified
expert begins when the defendant complies with the claimant's request. 35 If the defendant fails to comply with the claimant's request,
the claimant is excused from the obligation of filing a certificate of a
qualified expert. 36
The requirement to file a certificate of a qualified expert only pertains to civil actions, "originally filed in circuit court against a licensed
professional," and arising from that professional's negligent act or
omission in connection with the rendering of professional services. 37
A "licensed professional" is defined as:
25. Id. § 14-102. This legislative policy is very similar to the state's interest in
regulating architecture. See supra text accompanying note 12.
26. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. acc. & PROF. § 14-304. The applicant must be "of
good character and reputation," and meet certain education requirements.
Id. § 14-304(b), (c). The education requirement for an applicant may be
waived if he or she has a significant amount of work experience. Id. ~ 14305(a), (d).
27. Id. § 14-304(c). The examination consists of an eight-hour examination on
the "fundamentals of engineering" and an eight-hour examination on the
"principles and practice of engineering." Id. § 14-307(d)(1).
28. See discussion supra Part II.A. Corporations are authorized to engage in
professional engineering. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. acc. & PROF. § 14-401 (a).
The engineer's individual liability is not affected by the fact that he or she
practices through a corporate form. Id.14-401(c)(2).
29. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
30. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. acc. & PROF. §§ 14-101 to 14-602. The Maryland
Professional Engineers Act does not mention that a permit is required. Id.
31. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a) (2002).
32. Id. § 3-2C-02(a) (1), (2) (ii).
33. Id. § 3-2C-02(c)(1).
34. Id. § 3-2C-02(b) (1).
35. Id. § 3-2C-02(b)(2).
36. Id. § 3-2C-02(b) (3).
37. Id. § 3-2C-01(b) (defining the term "claim").

Baltimore Law Review

246

[Vol. 34

(1) An architect licensed under Title 3 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article;
(2) An interior designer certified under Title 8 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article;
(3) A landscape architect licensed under Title 9 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article;
(4) A professional engineer licensed under Title 14 of the
Business Occupations and Professions Article; or
(5) A professional land surveyor or property line surveyor licensed under Title 15 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. 38
A "qualified expert" is any individual who is a licensed professional
in Maryland, or another state, and who is knowledgeable in the standard of care applicable to the same professional service of the defendant. 39 In spite of this, some individuals who meet the above
requirement may still not be used as qualified experts. 40 A valid certificate requires that the qualified expert attest that the licensed professional, against whom the claim has been filed, has failed to meet the
applicable standard of care. 41

D.

Other States

Several other states have a similar requirement for suits against architects and engineers. The requirements in California, Colorado,
and Georgia provide a contrast to the requirements in Maryland. 42
1.

California

An individual who sues a licensed architect, engineer, or land surveyor in California is required to file and serve a certificate. 43 This
certificate must be filed "on or before the date of service of the complaint ."44 The California statute allows some exceptions to the gen38. Id. § 3-2C-Ol(c) (1)-(5).

39. Id. § 3-2C-Ol(d)(I). Hence, if someone sued a licensed architect in Maryland for professional negligence, the plaintiffs qualified expert would also
have to be a licensed architect, either in Maryland or another state. Id.
The plaintiff may not use an unlicensed professional engineer as his qualified expert. Id.
40. Id. § 3-2C-Ol (d) (2). Namely, parties to the claim, employees or partners of
a party to the claim, employees or shareholders of a professional association of which a party to the claim is a stockholder, and individuals having a
financial interest in the outcome of the suit may not act as a qualified expert. Id.
41. Id. § 3-2C-02(a)(2)(i).
42. CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 411.35 (West 2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20602 (West Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2004). For a full
discussion of this provision, see Robert D. Brussack, Georgia's Professional
Malpractice Affidavit Requirement, 31 GA. L. REv. 1031 (1997).
43. CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE ~ 411.35(a).
44. Id.
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eral requirement, unlike Maryland. 45 Failure to comply with the
certificate requirement is grounds for a demurrer or a motion to
strike. 46
The Court of Appeal of California has indicated that the certificate
requirement is valid in suits against corporate defendants who perform architectural services. 47 The court did not question or analyze
whether the certificate requirement applies in cases with corporate
defendants. The court did state, however, that the section requiring
the certificate was enacted to prevent frivolous lawsuits. 48

2.

Colorado

Claimants suing acupuncturists or other licensed professionals for
professional negligence, in Colorado, are required to file a certificate
of review with the court. 49 The certificate of review must be filed
within sixty days after service of the complaint, unless good cause is
shown for extending the time limit. 50 Failure to file a certificate of
review results in dismissal of the complaint. 51
The statute explicitly provides that the certificate of review requirements apply to suits against firms. 52 The requirement has been held
to apply when the defendant is a limited liability company,53 and is
45. In California, the certificate is "executed by the attorney for the plaintiff
••••n
Id. § 411.35(b). The attorney attests that he or she has consulted
with a licensed professional, and based on this consultation the attorney
has determined that in his or her professional judgment, the suit is meritorious. Id. § 411.35(b)(I). Alternatively, the attorney may attest that it was
impossible to consult with a licensed professional before filing the claim
because the statute of limitations would have expired had the attorney
done so. Id. § 411.35(b)(2). If the attorney attests to this, the certificate
must be filed within sixty days after the complaint is filed. Id. In a third
alternative, the attorney may attest that he or she made three separate,
good faith attempts to consult with three separate licensed architects, engineers, or land sUlveyors, but none of the individuals would agree to the
consultation. Id. § 411.35(b)(3). Finally, the requirement is waived if the
attorney plans to rely solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. Id.
§ 411.35(d).
46. Id. § 411.35(g).
47. Ponderosa Ctr. Partners v. McClellan/Cruz/Gaylord & Assocs., 45 Cal. App.
4th 913 (1996).
48. Id. at 915.
49. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(1)(a) (West Supp. 2003).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 13-20-602(4). Unlike California courts, Colorado courts will not waive
the certificate of review requirement when the plaintiff relies solely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, "at least when there is no evidence ... that the
defendant had any control over the instrumentality causing the injury." Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586, 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
52. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(b).
53. Miller v. Rowtech, LLC, 3 P.3d 492, 494-95 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
the defendant waived the defense that a certificate of review was required
by waiting until a post-trial motion to raise the issue).
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required when the defendant is the state government. 54 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that dismissal is required for failure to
file a certificate of review when the plaintiff seeks damages against
either the licensed professional who is named as a party or against the
professional's employer. 55 The court determined that the language of
the statute was ambiguous as to whether a certificate of review is required when the state is the defendant. 56 To clarify the ambiguity, the
court found that both the legislative history and legislative purpose
indicated that the certificate of review requirement applies when the
suit is against the professional's employer. 57 Therefore, in Colorado,
corporations, employers and individual licensees have the protection
of the certificate of review requirement.
3.

Georgia

In Georgia, a claimant who sues a licensed professional or a health
care facility is required to attach an affidavit of a person competent to
testify as an expert to the complaint. 58 If preparation of the affidavit
would cause the statute of limitations to expire, the claimant must
supplement his claim within forty-five days after filing the complaint. 59
If the affidavit is not filed, the suit is subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim.60 Georgia, unlike Maryland, permits the affidavit to be
filed by the claimant himself. 61
The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that the protection of the
affidavit requirement extends to architectural firms, as well as to individual architects. 62 The Court of Appeals of Georgia has also held
54. Colo. Dep't of Corrs. v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 509 (Colo. 2000). Nieto was
an inmate who sought treatment at the prison medical clinic. [d. at 497-98.
He alleged that the clinic staff was negligent in his treatment, causing him
permanent paralysis. [d. at 498. The trial court dismissed Nieto's negligence claim against the treating nurse because he failed to comply with the
certificate of review requirement in a timely manner. [d. The state, however, was held liable on the basis of respondeat superior and ordered to pay
$150,000. [d. at 498-99. The state appealed, but the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that the certificate of review requirement did not apply to the
state as an entity since it was not a "licensed professional" within the meaning of the statute. [d. at 496, 499.
55. [d. at 496.
56. [d. at 500.
57. [d. at 502-04.
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (a) (Supp. 2004). Architects and engineers are
specifically listed as professionals to whom the requirement applies. [d. § 911-9.1(£)(1), (19).
59. [d. § 9-11-9.1 (b).
60. [d.
61. Findleyv. Davis, 414 S.E.2d 317, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). See also supra note
40 discussing the comparable Maryland requirement.
62. See HollS. Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 383 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 1989), vacated
in part !Jy 429 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). The Housing Authority of
Savannah was sued for the wrongful death ofa tenant, who died from exposure to carbon monoxide caused by the faulty design and construction of
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that engineering firms, when named as defendants, may assert the defense of the plaintiffs failure to file an affidavit. 63 These cases, however, were decided under a previous version of the current statute,
and may no longer be applicable. 64

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

This section will first discuss the similarities between the certificate
of a qualified expert requirements in suits against architects and engineers and those against "health care providers." Next it will discuss,
the cases that have interpreted the provisions requiring a certificate of
a qualified expert. This section will also outline the purposes of corporate practice of architecture and engineering, and the legislative
history behind the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. Finally, this section will argue that the protection of the certificate of a
qualified expert should extend to corporations.
A.

Health Care Malpractice Claims

In addition to architects and engineers, Maryland also mandates
that a certificate of a qualified expert be filed within ninety days after
a complaint for claims against health care providers. 65 The certificate
must be filed with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office. 66 Failure to file a certificate of qualified expert results in dismissal of the claim without prejudice. 67 A "health care provider" is
defined as:
[A] hospital, a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of
the Health-General Article, a physician, an osteopath, an optometrist, a chiropractor, a registered or licensed practical

63.
64.

65.

the heating system. [d. at 868. The Housing Authority filed a third-party
suit against Gilpin + Bazemore/Architects & Planners, Inc., who designed
the system. [d.
S. Eng'g Co. v. Cent. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 389 S.E.2d 380, 381 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 395 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. 1990).
In 1997, the Georgia statute was amended to read: "In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against a professional licensed Uy the
State of Georgia and listed in subsection (f) of this Code section .... " GA.
CODE ANN. S 9-11-9.1 (a) (emphasis added). Greene and Southern Engineering
Co. were decided prior to the amendment when the statute read: "In any
action for damages alleging professional malpractice . . . . " Greene, 383
S.E.2d at 867. By limiting the affidavit requirement to only those claims
against a professional licensed in Georgia, the Georgia legislature may have
intended to preclude corporations from receiving the protection of the
affidavit.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(a) (1), (b)(l)(i) (Supp.2004).
This requirement is waived if the sole issue is the lack of informed consent.
[d. § 3-2A-04(b). Further, initial jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the
Health Claims Arbitration Office. Schwartz v. Lilly, 53 Md. App. 318, 32122,452 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1982).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b) (1)(i).

66.
67. [d.
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nurse, a dentist, a podiatrist, a psychologist, a licensed certified social worker-clinical, and a physical therapist, licensed
or authorized to provide one or more health care services in
Maryland. 68
The purpose of these provisions is to (1) respond to a perceived
"malpractice insurance crisis,"69 and (2) "screen malpractice claims,
[and] ferret out meritless ones.,,70 By requiring a certificate of a qualified expert, the legislature sought to prevent frivolous claims from
reaching court. 71
In keeping with this goal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
held that a claim against an organization, which is not within the literal definition of health care provider, is subject to the requirements
of the Health Care Arbitration Act. 72 Specifically, in Group Health Association v. Blumenthal,73 the court found that a health management organization (HMO) did not fall within the meaning of a health care
provider. 74 Because the plaintiffs' suit against the HMO was founded
on the doctrine of respondeat superior,75 the court held that the suit
was bound by the provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Claims
Statute. 76 The court also looked to the legislative history of the act,
thereby gleaning legislative intent. 77 By construing the statute in such
a way that the certificate of a qualified expert and arbitration provisions would cover as many suits as possible, the court gave effect to the
legislature's intent to "establish a 'mechanism to screen malpractice
claims prior to the filing of suit.' "78
Similarly, Maryland courts should construe the provisions requiring
a certificate of a qualified expert in suits against architects and engi68. Id. § 3-2A-Ol(e) (Supp.2004).
69. Bovey v. Executive Dir., 292 Md. 640, 641, 441 A.2d 333, 334 (1982).
70. Adler v. Hyman, 334 Md. 568, 575, 640 A.2d 1100, 1103 (1994) (citing
Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 113,453 A.2d 1198, 1204
(1983» .
71. See id.
72. Group Health Ass'n, 295 Md. at 112, 453 A.2d at 1203. Group Health Association (hereinafter "GHA") was a health management organization, of
which Blumenthal was a member. Id. at 105-06, 453 A.2d at 1200-01. Mter
informing GHA that she believed she was pregnant, Blumenthal received
prenatal care from several GHA employees. Id. at 106, 453 A.2d at 1201.
Mter the employees gave her allegedly negligent care, Blumenthal sought
to bypass the Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute and sue GHA in federal district court based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 107-08, 453 A.2d
at 1201.
73. 295 Md. 104,453 A.2d 1198 (1983).
74. Id. at 110, 453 A.2d at 1203.
75. Since the HMO itself could not have committed a negligent act (as it is a
legal fiction), in suits against it for the negligent acts of its employees, it
should be entitled to the same treatment that the employee would receive.
76. Id. at Ill, 453 A.2d at 1203.
77. Id. at 112-13, 453 A.2d at 1203-04.
78. See id. at 113, 453 A.2d at 1204 (citation omitted).

2004]

The Maryland Certificate of Qualified Expert

251

neers to encompass claims against corporations. Although a corporation does not fit precisely within the definition of a licensed
professional,79 the courts should follow the Court of Appeals' decision
in Group Health Association to broaden the scope of the statute to encompass as many claims as possible and effectuate the legislative
intent. 8o

B.

Court Decisions Interpreting
§§ 3-2C-01 and 3-2C-02

1.

Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates, Inc. 81

MD. CODE ANN., CTS.

& JUD. PROC.

On April 9, 2004, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
corporate defendant practicing architecture or engineering was not
entitled to the protections of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 82 In April of 1996, Baltimore County, Maryland ("Baltimore County"), entered into a contract with RTKL Associates, Inc.
(RTKL) for RTKL to provide certain engineering and construction
services for Phase I of the Dundee-Saltpeter Environmental Park, a
future education center. 83 RTKL retained Andrews, Miller & Associates (AMA) to provide "engineering services associated with the grading of the property."84 AMA apparently completed its work under the
contract in 1998. 85 In 1999, Baltimore County discovered that the
benchmarks AMA had set were inaccurate. 86 This caused substantial
damages and delays, as more dirt had to be brought in to remedy the
problem; foundation walls, already in place, had to be changed; wall
panels had to be disassembled; additional concrete had to be laid; and
the slab of the grade had to be changed. 87
Baltimore County brought suit against RTKL and AMA in August of
2001, alleging breach of contract and negligence. 88 RTKL and AMA
79. In this context a licensed professional is defined as "[a]n architect licensed
under Title 3 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article." MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2G01(c)(l) (2001). A corporation can
never be a licensed architect since a licensed architect is an individual who
is licensed to practice architecture in Maryland. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ.
& PROF. § 3-101(b), (i) (2004).
80. These aspects of the law will be discussed in greater detail infra Parts III.D
and I1I.E.
81. 380 Md. 670, 846 A.2d 433 (2004).
82. Id. at 690, 846 A.2d at 445.
83. Id. at 672, 846 A.2d at 434. SpeCifically, RTKL was to "provide design development, construction documents, and bid assistance." Id.
84. Id. at 672-73, 846 A.2d at 434 (internal quotes omitted).
85. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 434. The court notes that "the record is not entirely
clear on this point." Id.
86. Id. Specifically, the benchmarks were inaccurate by 0.092 feet, and hence
"all grading of dirt was done 0.092 feet too low." Id. (internal quotes
omitted).
87. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 434-35.
88. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 435.
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moved to dismiss, alleging that the suit was subject to arbitration and
had not been filed within the statute of limitations. 89 The circuit
court denied the defendants' motion concerning arbitration, "but did
not expressly rule on the limitations issue."90 RTKL and AMA filed an
interlocutory appeal asking the Court of Special Appeals to rule on
both issues. 91 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court
with regard to arbitration, but held "that no interlocutory appeal lay
from [the circuit court's] implied ruling on the limitations issue."92
On remand to the circuit court, RTKL and AMA again moved to
dismiss based on the statute oflimitations and Baltimore County's failure to comply with the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 93
The circuit court denied the defendants' motion as it related to the
certificate of a qualified expert requirement, but granted the motions
to dismiss as to the limitations issue. 94 The circuit court held that the
certificate of a qualified expert requirement only applied to suits
against individual licensed professionals, not corporations. 95 Both the
plaintiff and the defendants appealed the court's ruling. 96 The Court
of Appeals then granted certiorari on its own initiative, taking the case
before the Court of Special Appeals had an opportunity to consider
the issues. 97
The court devoted approximately ninety-three percent of its discussion to the statute of limitations issue, devoting less than one page to
the issue of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 98 RTKL
and AMA based their arguments largely on an unpublished decision
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. 99 The court
held that the certificate of a qualified expert requirement applied
only to individuals, because the statute defined "licensed professional"
as "an architect licensed under Title 3 of the Business Occupations
and Professions Article" or a "professional engineer licensed under
Title 14" of the same Article.1Oo The court then noted that the Business Occupations and Professions Article "makes clear that only an
89. Id. The defendants relied on the applicable statute of limitations in suits
naming a county as a defendant, however, in the present case, the county
was the plaintiff. Id. at 677, 846 A.2d at 437.
90. Id. at 673, 846 A.2d at 435.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 674, 846 A.2d at 435.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 674-90, 846 A.2d at 435-45.
99. Id. at 689-90, 846 A.2d at 444-45. Specifically, RTKL and AMA relied on
Ferrell v. American Property Construction Company. Id. at 690, 846 A.2d at 445.
This case is discussed infra Part III.B.4.
100. Id. at 690, 846 A.2d at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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individual may be licensed as an architect" or engineer. 101 The court
also found this restriction was necessary, because specified education
and completion of an examination is required to become a licensed
professional. 102 The court therefore held that only individuals may be
licensed, and the circuit court had correctly decided the issue.103
The Court of Appeals' cursory approach to this issue demonstrates
that the court failed to consider several issues in its ruling. While the
court devoted fifteen pages to the issue of limitations, it devoted less
than one page to the issue of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 104 The court did not cite any legislative history or the purpose of the statute in construing the certificate of a qualified expert
requirement. 105 The court also did not layout the possible implications of its ruling, nor did it address the implications if it were to rule
in the alternative. 106 The court did not even entertain the possibility
that the statute was ambiguous. 107 Despite not dealing with these issues, in the very same opinion, the court laid out its professed test for
interpreting statutes: to give effect to legislative intent by looking at
the plain meaning, the legislative history, and the legal effect of competing constructions. 108 The court thus gave extensive treatment to
the words "claim" and "claimant" in the statute of limitations, but no
more than a fleeting analysis of the certificate of a qualified expert
requirement. IOg Even though the court was erroneous in this decision, the court has demonstrated that it is willing to reverse itself upon
a showing that its prior rulings were fallacious interpretations of the
law. 110

2.

Heritage Harbour, L.L. C. v. John J Reynolds, Inc. lll

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has also had the opportunity to review whether a corporation is entitled to receive the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 112 In
late 1998, the Council of Unit Owners of South River Condominium
filed an action against Heritage Harbour, L.L.C. and several other de101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 674-90, 846 A.2d at 435-45.
See id. at 689-90, 846 A.2d at 444-45.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 678, 846 A.2d at 437-38.
Id. at 674-90, 846 A.2d at 435-45.
See Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 21, 59, 825 A.2d 365, 387-88 (2003)
(overruling a line of cases that read language into the worker's compensation statutes that did not belong there).
111. 143 Md. App. 698, 795 A.2d 806 (2002). It should be noted that the Court
of Appeals, in Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates Inc., did not cite Heritage
Harbour, L.L.G. at all. 380 Md. 670, 846 A.2d 433.
112. Heritage Harbour, L.L.G., 143 Md. App. at 708-09, 795 A.2d at 812.
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fendants ("appellants"), alleging various defects in the construction of
the condominiums. 113 The appellants then filed a complaint for contribution and indemnification against John J. Reynolds, Inc., and several other defendants ("appellees")Y4 Several of the appellees filed
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, many of which were
granted. 115
In Heritage Harbour, L.L.G., the appellants did not timely file a certificate of a qualified expert as to any of the appellees. 116 Without inquiring into whether the certificate of a qualified expert applies to
corporate defendants, the court agreed with the appellees that failure
to so file entitled the appellees to dismissal of the suit. 117 Although
the court reached the proper conclusion, it did not give enough analysis as to why a corporation offering professional services should be
extended the same level of protection as an individual architect or
engineer.
3.

Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc. 11S

Adams was decided in the United States District Court for the District of Marylandy9 Seventeen families ("plaintiffs"), who were residents of the Calvert Ridge development in Elkridge, Maryland,
brought suit against various corporations and individuals for concealing the fact that the plaintiffs' homes were built on a solid waste
dump.12o Some of these defendants l21 filed third party claims against
Gutschick-a civil engineering, surveying, and planning firm-for indemnity based on Gutschick's alleged breach of contract and negligence in providing civil engineering services. 122 Gutschick moved for
summary judgment, based in part on the third-party plaintiffs' failure
to comply with the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. 123
In deciding the issue, the court first stated that the claim against
Gutschick was not a "claim" within the meaning of the statute because
the suit was not originally instituted in a Maryland circuit court. 124
113. Id. at 702, 795 A.2d at 808. In total, there were seven of these defendants.
Id.
114. Id. at 703, 795 A.2d at 808-09. There were eighteen of these defendants.
Id. (not all of these defendants joined in the appeal considered in Heritage
Harbour, L.L. G.). A number of these parties were architectural or engineering firms. Id.
115. Id. at 703-04, 795 A.2d at 809.
116. Id. at 708, 795 A.2d at 812.
117. Id. at 708-09, 795 A.2d at 812.
118. 135 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Md. 2001).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 679-80.
121. Brantley Development and Nantucket (developers and marketers of the
homes). Id. at 679-81.
122. Id. at 712-13.
123. See id. at 716.
124. Id.
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The court also held that Gutschick, as an engineering firm and not an
individual, would not qualify as a licensed professional. 125 Based, in
part, on the fact that only licensed professionals are entitled to the
protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement,
and Gutschick is not a licensed professional, the court denied their
motion for summary judgment. 126
This court reached an improper conclusion in Adams much the
same way the Court of Appeals did in RTKL Associates. The court construed the statute much too narrowly and did not consider legislative
intent. 127 Instead, it read the statute literally, without taking into account the inherent ambiguity in the statute and the effect of such a
narrow interpretation. 128 Further, the decision can be distinguished
from any reported case decided in Maryland, as one of the court's
reasons for denying Gutschick's motion was that the claim was not
originally filed in a Maryland circuit court. 129 Hence, its statement
that the certificate of a qualified expert requirement does not apply to
suits against engineering firms can be viewed as dictum. 13o
4.

Ferrell v. American Property Construction CO. 131

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in Ferrell v. American Property Construction Co., directly addressed the issue of
whether a firm is entitled to the protection offered by the certificate
of a qualified expert requirement. 132 The court first applied the
Eriel 33 doctrine, and, relying on two cases from other federal circuits
dealing with similar issues, found that the certificate of a qualified expert requirement applied to suits filed in federal court. 134 The court
also cited a Fourth Circuit decision, which held that the Maryland
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

13l.
132.

133.
134.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.D (discussing legislative intent).
See infra Parts III.D-E (discussing the ambiguity present in the statute, the
effects of such ambiguity, and the effects of this erroneous interpretation).
Adams, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
See id. In other words, by ruling that the certificate of a qualified expert
requirement does not apply because the case was not instituted in a Maryland circuit court, the court did not need to answer the question of
whether Gutschick would otherwise be entitled to such protection because
of its status as a firm. The first decision was all that was necessary to deny
Gutschick's motion for summary judgment.
Civil Action No. WMN-02-1131 (D. Md. Aug. 15,2003) (mem.).
Id. at 1, 3. In this case, the party that sought dismissal because of the claimant's failure to comply with the certificate of a qualified expert requirement
was a partnership, not a corporation. Id. at l. Furthermore, the partnership was engaged in architecture, not engineering. Id.
See generally Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.s. 64 (1938).
Ferrell, C.A. No. WMN-02-113l.
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Health Care Malpractice Claims Act applied to cases filed in federal
court. 135
The court discredited Adams by holding that partnerships engaged
in architecture are entitled to the protection offered by the certificate
of a qualified expert requirement. 136 To reach this decision, the court
relied on Group Health Association v. Blumenthal. 137 The court found
that, similar to Group Health Association, liability could only be imposed
on the partnership on the basis of respondeat superior.138 Hence, the
firm should be given the protection of the certificate of a qualified
expert requirement.
The court in Ferrell reached the correct conclusion, but for the
wrong reason. Instead of basing its decision on respondeat superior,
the court should have looked to legislative intent to determine that
architectural firms are entitled to the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert. By basing its decision on respondeat superior, the court muddles the issue of whether a firm is entitled to the
protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. Respondeat superior liability only arises when an employee commits a
tort while acting within the scope of his employment. 139 For the tortious conduct to be considered "within the scope of employment," the
acts must be "in furtherance of the employer's business and ... 'authorized' by the employer."14o In order for a corporation to gain the
protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement under
this interpretation of the statute, the corporation would need to prove
that liability, if it existed, was based on respondeat superior. l41 By importing this aspect of general tort law into the issue of the certificate
of a qualified expert protection for firms, the court has only complicated the issue.
135. Ferrell, C.A. No. WMN-02-1131 at 4-5 (citing Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt.,
Inc., 617 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), aff'g 462 F. Supp. 778
(D. Md. 1978)).
136. [d. at 7.
137. [d. at 6-7. Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104,453 A.2d 1198
(1983). This case is discussed in detail supra Part III.A.
138. Ferrell, C. A. No. WMN-02-1131 at 7.
139. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30, 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995). If liability is
founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employee and the
employer are jointly and severally liable to the claimant. S. Mgmt. Corp. v.
Taha, 378 Md. 461, 481, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (2003); see also DiPino v. Davis,
354 Md. 18, 47-48, 729 A.2d 354, 369-70 (1999) (suggesting that an aggrieved party may hold either a police officer or her employer liable for the
officer's tortious conduct, assuming the officer acted in a proprietary or
private capacity).
140. Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 255, 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991).
141. Nevertheless, if the corporation were able to prove that the employee acted
outside of his or her employment, the corporation could not be held liable
for the alleged negligence of the employee. See Oaks, 339 Md. at 30, 660
A.2d at 426.
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The Purpose of the Corporate Practice of Architecture and Engineering

The practice of architecture or engineering through a corporation
is permitted in Maryland. 142 The stockholders of the corporation are
largely relieved of all debts owed by the corporation to outside creditors of the corporation, including creditors in tort. 143 Maryland
courts also consider a corporation a separate entity, independent of
its shareholders. 144 However, when an individual practices architecture or engineering through a corporation, and that individual is a
stockholder, he or she is not relieved of any personal liability related
to the negligent performance of the professional service. 145 Hence,
the incentive to practice architecture or engineering through a corporate form is significantly less than the incentive for other non-professional industries. Nevertheless, the architect or engineer would still
probably prefer to incorporate, as it would relieve him or her of personal liability for certain debts of the corporation, which are not involved with the practice of architecture, such as a lease on office space
or contracts with suppliers. 146
Additionally, incorporation is a popular way in which a business can
raise capital through the sale of equity securities. 147 Although architectural firms may choose to raise capital by the sale of equity securities, the composition of the boards of directors of such corporations
face restrictions not present in traditional corporations. 148 Furthermore, if the corporation practicing architecture or engineering incorporated as a professional service corporation,149 only individuals
142. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402(a) (2004) (architecture); § 14401 (a) (engineering).
143. See Damazo v. Wah by, 259 Md. 627,633,270 A.2d 814,817 (1970). Stockholders may, however, be held liable under Maryland's version of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine "to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount
equity." Id. at 633-34, 270 A.2d at 817. For a full discussion of the limited
liability protections offered by incorporation, see Larry E. Ribstein, Limited
Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REv. 80 (1991).
144. Fuller v. Horvath, 42 Md. App. 671, 684, 402 A.2d 134, 142 (1979).
145. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402 (c) (2) (architecture); § 14401(c)(2) (engineering).
146. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-402 (c) (2) (architecture); § 14401(c)(2) (engineering).
147. See How the Stock Market Works, at http://www.ameritrade.com/educa
tionv2/fhtml/stockmarket/ipos.fhtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (describing how corporations raise capital through the sale of stock, including a
description of underwriting).
148. To be eligible for a permit, a corporation practicing architecture must have
at least two-thirds of its directors licensed in any state to practice architecture. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-404(b) (1). Also, the responsible member in charge of the practice must be a Maryland-licensed architect
and a director of the corporation. Id. § 3-404(c). Firms practicing professional engineering do not have similar requirements.
149. MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & AsS'NS §§ 5-101(g), S-102(a) (1999) (defining a
professional service).
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licensed to provide that same service may be stockholders. I5o Also, a
corporate form becomes a necessity when revenues grow large. I51
D.

The Legislative History Behind the Certificate of a Qualified Expert
Requirement

The statutes requiring a certificate of a qualified expert in suits
against architects, engineers, and other professionals, was enacted in
1998. Similar bills were introduced in 1996 and 1997, but both measures failed. 152 Various professional societies voiced support for the
bill, including the Maryland Society of Surveyors,I53 the Maryland
Chapter of the American Society of Landscape Architects,I54 the Maryland Society of the American Institute of Architects,155 the Maryland
section of the American Society of Civil Engineers,156 and the Consulting Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washington. I57 Additionally,
150. Id. § 5-109(a). This limitation on the option of who may own stock in the
corporation is the principal reason it makes little sense to incorporate an
architectural or engineering corporation as a professional service corporation. See supra note 17.
151. In Maryland, the corporate form provides a formalized management structure. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2-401 (directors); § 2412 (officers); § 2-507 (stockholders). This formal structure is the only feasible way to ensure all stockholders' interests are protected when revenues
and operations grow large, as it provides the stockholders with control over
the election of directors. The directors in tum, run the affairs of the corporation and, unless otlIerwise provided, appoint the officers, who act pursuant to powers granted to tlIem by the bylaws and or resolutions of the board
of directors. Id. § 2-404(b) (1) (stockholders' votes determine who the directors will be); § 2-401 (directors run the affairs of the corporation); § 2413(a) (directors appoint officers); § 2-414(a) (1)-(2) (powers of officers).
152. JUDIClARyCOMM., BILL ANALYSIS, H.D. 412-188 (Md, 1998) (on file with the
author). The 1996 bill required the certificate to contain a statement that
the defendant's failure to meet tlIe standard of care caused the plaintiff's
injuries. Id. The 1997 bill omitted this requirement and was passed by the
House of Delegates, but the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee failed
to issue a report. Id.
153. Letter from Charles A. Irish, Jr., President, Maryland Society of Surveyors,
to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee
(Mar. 9, 1998) (on file with the author).
154. Letter from Charles Brenton, Chairman of Legislative Affairs, Maryland
Chapter, American Society of Landscape Architects, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file
with the author).
155. Letter from Peter Horton, Legislative Chairman, Maryland Society of the
American Institute of Architects, to Delegate Anne Marie Doory, Vice
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the
author).
156. Letter from Daniel T. Cheng, President, Maryland Section of tlIe American
Society of Civil Engineers, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial
Proceedings Committee (Feb. 20, 1998) (on file with the author).
157. Letter from Consulting Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washington, to
Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar.
11, 1998) (on file with tlIe author).
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the Carroll County,15S Queen Anne's County,159 and Maryiand I60
Chambers of Commerce all supported the legislation. VIKA Incorporated, a corporation offering engineering, planning, landscape architectural, surveying, and global positioning services also voiced support
for the bill. 16I The Maryland Department of Highway Transportation,
State Highway Administration, did not take a position on the bill,
pending the possible insertion of language that would waive the certificate of a qualified expert requirement when government entities
were concerned. 162 The law firm of Freishtat & Sandler is the only
entity whose opposition to the bill has been recorded in the legislative
history.163 There are no indications in the legislative history whether
the bill's protection was meant to extend to corporate practice of architecture or engineering.
In the eyes of its supporters, the primary intent of the bill was to
protect design professionals from frivolous lawsuits. 164 Secondary
considerations included: (1) the enhanced competitive position of
Maryland design professionals by decreasing the cost of insurance and

158. Letter from Helen C. Utz, Executive Director, Carroll County Chamber of
Commerce, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings
Committee (Feb. 10, 1998) (on file with the author).
159. Letter from Robert R. Miller, Chairman, Legislative Committee of the
Queen Anne's County Chamber of Commerce, to Delegate Joseph Vallario,
Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with
the author).
160. Memorandum from the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, to the Judiciary
Committee (Mar. 11, 1998) (on file with the author).
161. Letter from Charles A. Irish, Jr., Executive Vice President, VIKA Incorporated, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 9, 1998) (on file with the author).
162. Letter from Elizabeth L. Homer, Deputy Administrator, Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway Administration, to Delegate Joseph
Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 11, 1998) (on
file with the author).
163. Letter from David Freishtat, Attorney, Freishtat & Sandler, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 2, 1998)
(on file with the author). Mr. Freishtat objected because he was concerned
that (1) the bill violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, (2) the bill's anticonsumer consequences outweighed its purposes, (3) the 20% limitation
on professional activities imposed upon an expert to qualify to issue a certificate of a qualified expert was arbitrary, abusive, and provided an unfair
advantage to some defendants. Id.
164. E.g., Letter from Peter Horton, Legislative Chairman, Maryland Society of
the American Institute of Architects, to Delegate Anne Marie Doory, Vice
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 10, 1998) (on file with the
author) ("The proposed bill is designed to deter meritless lawsuits against
licensed professionals .... ").
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administrative time,165 (2) a reduction in court congestion,166 and (3)
job creation. 167
E.

The Purpose of the Legislation is Best Served by Extending the Protection
of a Certificate of a Qualified Expert Requirement to Corporations Practicing Architecture and Engineering

To adequately serve the purpose of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should reverse its
recent decision and extend the protection of the certificate of a qualified expert to corporations practicing architecture and engineering.
The danger of not extending the protection may be seen from the
following hypothetical.
A consumer, C, retains an architectural corporation, AC, to provide
architectural services. AC designates designer, D, as the architect in
charge of the project. Mter completion of the project, C is unhappy
with the results and contemplates suing for professional negligence.
C can sue either D (as an individual) or AC (as a corporation) .168. Assuming that C's claim is groundless and that no other licensed architect would file a certificate of a qualified expert on C's behalf, C's
meritless claim against D could not continue. 169 But by refusing this
protection to AC, C could continue her suit, on the same set of facts
creating a meritless suit, against AC.
Because the plaintiff in a professional malpractice suit can choose
whether to sue the individual architect who performed the work, or
the architectural corporation that employs the individual architect,170
it is only equitable that the corporation should have the same protec165. E.g., Letter from Charles Brenton, Chairman, Legislative Affairs, Maryland
Chapter of the American Society of Landscape Architects, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 9, 1998)
(on file with the author) (the bill will allow" Ll] andscape [a] rchitects practicing in Maryland [to] anticipate reductions to overhead costs such as insurance and administrative time.").
166. E.g., Letter from Robert R. Miller, Chairman, Legislative Committee,
Queen Anne's County Chamber of Commerce, to Delegate Joseph Vallario,
Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with
the author) ("The passage of this bill would help eliminate many frivolous
lawsuits which take so much of our courts' available time.").
167. E.g., Letter from Consulting Engineers Council of Metropolitan Washington, to Delegate Joseph Vallario, Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 11, 1998) (on file with the author) (the bill will "return
productive time and revenue to professional services, thereby creating
jobs.").
168. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
169. See MD. CODE fum., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-02(a) (1) (2002). If Cis unable to obtain a certificate of a qualified expert, the claim against the individual architect is dismissed without prejudice. Id.
170. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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tion available to the individual. l7l Given that courts should endeavor
to apply legislative intent when construing statutes,172 the only successful way to further the intent of preventing frivolous suits for architectural or engineering malpractice is to extend the protection of the
certificate of a qualified expert requirement to suits against corporations engaged in architecture or engineering.
Many architects and engineers in Maryland are employed by corporations. As of 1997, the Census Bureau reported 378 employer architectural firms with 2,372 employees and 1,375 employer professional
engineering firms with 30,901 employees operating in Maryland. 173
These numbers can be compared to the 887 non-employer architectural firms 174 and 1,830 non-employer professional engineering
firms.175 With such substantial numbers of architects and professional
171. The above hypothetical is equally applicable to engineers and corporations
engaged in engineering. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
172. Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 253, 808 A.2d 795, 800
(2002).
173. Economic Census, 1997, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, Maryland,
at http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/md/MDOOO_54.HTM (Page generated Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Economic Census] (on file with the author).
One cannot assume that all of these employees are licensed architects or
professional engineers (as some of them are undoubtedly unlicensed support personnel). In 2002, the twenty-five largest architectural firms in the
Baltimore area (ranked by billings originating from Baltimore-area offices)
employed 428 architects. Largest Architecture Firms in the Baltimare Area, BALT.
Bus. j., Dec. 19, 2003, at 126 (hereinafter Largest Architecture Firms). The
local offices of these firms employed a total of 1,409 non-architects. [d.
Eliminating the outlier (URS Corporation employed eleven architects and
650 other staff in its Hunt Valley, Maryland office), this equates to 759 support staff, or a ratio of approximately 0.549 architects per staff member of
any designation. [d. Assuming this ratio is accurate for all employer architectural firms, the author estimates that approximately 1,302 architects
practice through corporations in Maryland. [d.; see also Economic Census,
supra. Further, the 2002 billings of the largest architectural firms in the
Baltimore area exceeded $186 million. Largest Architecture Firms, supra, at
126. Likewise, the twenty-five largest engineering firms in the Baltimore
area employ 676 local engineers (with the largest firm, Parsons Brinckerhoff, not reporting). [d. at 128. Unfortunately, the statistics regarding the
ratio of engmeers to other local staff is reported in a different fashion, and
a similar analysis to that employed for architectural firms cannot be used.
Moreover, the twenty-five largest engineering firms reported local billings
of more than $460 million. [d.
174. Nonemployer Statistics, 1998, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, Maryland, at http://www.census.gov/ epcd/nonemployer/1998/md/MDOOO_54.
HTM (last modified Sept. 23, 2003).
175. [d.

Non-employer firm data is primarily comprised of sole proprietorship businesses filing IRS Form 1040, Schedule C, although some
of the data is derived from filers of partnership and corporation tax
returns that report no paid employees. This data undergoes complex processing, editing, and analytical review at the Census Bureau to distinguish nonemployers from employers, correct and
complete data items, and form the final nonemployer universe.
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engineers practicing through corporations and generating such enormous billings, the above-described hypothetical demonstrates that the
legislative purpose behind the certificate of a qualified expert requirement would be defeated by refusing its protection to corporations.
Further, a refusal to permit corporations engaged in the practice of
architecture and professional engineering to e~oy the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement may violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 176 The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state is permitted to "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."177 By granting protection to individuals, but not to corporations, both of which practice in the same field, the statute may be in
violation of the United States Constitution; in such circumstances,
courts should interpret statutes in a manner that is consistent with the
Constitution. 178 It is undoubted that corporations enjoy some constitutional right to equal protection. 179 By granting an extraordinary
protection to individuals, the requirement of a certificate of merit, a
narrow reading of the statute may require that it be invalidated as
denying equal protection to corporations engaged in the same
activity.
F.

Arguments Against Extending the Protection of the Certificate of a Qualified Expert Requirement to Corporations

The primary argument against extending the protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement to corporations is the plain
language of the statute. The statute defines a licensed professional as
a licensed architect I80 or professional engineer. 181 A corporation,
necessarily, cannot obtain a license to practice either of these professions. 182 While courts endeavor to give effect to legislative intent,
their primary tool for divining such intent is the words of the statute
itself. I83 Although the inquiry into legislative intent usually ends at

176.
177.
178.
179.

180.
18I.
182.
183.

Purpose and Use of Nonemplayer Statistics, at http://www.census.gov/ epcd/
nonemployer/view/intro.html (revised Sept. 8, 2004).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l.
[d.
See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66
(1989) (noting that when possible, statutes enacted by Congress should be
interpreted such that they do not violate the Constitution).
See generally Pembina Conso!. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,
125 U.S. 181, 188-89' (1888). The Court determined that equal protection
concerns arose when one state charged a tax on corporations formed in
another state. [d.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2C-Ol (c)(l) (2002).
[d. § 3-2C-Ol(c)(4).
MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3-101 (b) (2004) (architecture); § 14101(h) (engineering).
Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 253, 808 A.2d 795, 801
(2002).
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the words of the statute,184 Maryland courts will also consider the
"purpose, goal, or context of the statute" in effectuating the intent of
the legislature. 185 The purpose of the statute is to ~revent frivolous
malpractice claims against architects and engineers,l 6 a purpose that
can only be effectively served by extending the protection of the statute to corporations. 187 Moreover, the strict construction of the statute
by the Court of Appeals defeats the purpose of the statute; because so
many architects and engineers practice through corporations and so
many millions of dollars are generated by that practice each year. 18S
The above hypothetical demonstrates how plaintiffs with meritless
claims can bypass the statute.
Another argument against extending the protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement to corporations is that the individual architects in a corporation should pay some price for gaining
limited liability. An architect who incorporates his practice and is a
shareholder gains the benefit of limited liability for the debts of the
corporation. 189 In exchange for this, the architect or professional engineer should lose the protection offered him by the certificate of a
qualified expert requirement, at least as it relates to the corporation's
practice. The United States Supreme Court has held that a corporation does not enjoy the same protections under the United States
Constitution as a natural person. 190 The issue of whether protections
offered by the Constitution are available to corporations, however,
"depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision."191 Even putting aside the fact that the protection
offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement is not constitutional in nature, the "nature, history and purpose" of the provision is clearly to prevent frivolous lawsuits asserting professional
design negligence. 192 Hence, the fact that a corporation is not a natural person should not prevent it from receiving this particular
protection.
184. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).
185. Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901
(1995).
186. Supra note 164 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Part I1LE.
188. Supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
189. See Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 633, 270 A.2d 814, 817 (1970). Although for those practicing architecture or professional engineering, liability for negligence relating to the rendering of professional services is not
limited by virtue of incorporation. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 3402(c)(2) (2004) (architecture); § 14-401 (c)(2) (engineering).
190. Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1946). Specifically,
the Court noted that corporations are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
191. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
192. Supra Part III.D.
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Arguments Against Extending the Protection of the Certificate of a Qualified Expert Requirement to Corporations Practicing Professional
Engineering

Unlike corporations practicing architecture,193 corporations that offer professional engineering services are not required to obtain a permit from the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation. 194
Some may argue that, because a corporation practicing architecture
must obtain a permit, such a corporation more closely fits the definition of a licensed professional within the meaning of the certificate of
a qualified expert requirement. 195 Nonetheless, the Maryland code
does not contain any language indicating that a corporation with a
permit to practice a professional service is within the definition of licensed professional. 196 Therefore, if corporations practicing architecture are entitled to the protection offered by the certificate of a
qualified expert requirement based on the notion of giving effect to
legislative intent,197 there is no reason to deny such protection to a
corporation engaged in professional engineering.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Maryland legislature took an important step in the direction of
tort reform by enacting the certificate of a qualified expert requirement. That protection will prove to be meaningless under the Court
of Appeals' recent decision in RTKL Associates to not extend to the
corporate practice of these professions. On the other hand, an extension of the protection to corporations would be consistent with both
legislative intent and prior Maryland case law. Further, the courts'
narrow reading of the statute, which denies corporations the protection of the certificate of a qualified expert requirement, may render
the statute unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
should reverse the holding of RTKL Associates and grant corporations
practicing architecture or professional engineering the protection offered by the certificate of a qualified expert requirement.
Gregory M. Garrett
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See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & PROF. § 3-403.
See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Oee. & PROF. § 14-401 to 14-602.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoe. § 3-2C-01(c)(1), (d)(l) (2002).
Id. § 3-2C-01(c).
Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 253, 808 A.2d 795, 800
(2002) .

